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GROUP LIBEL AND FREE SPEECH
LOREaN P. B~rn*

The subject of group libel has been of some importance in law
reviews since the publication of David Riesman's pioneering article
on the subject in 1942.1 Such interest as has been engendered,
however, has until recently been largely academic, for several
reasons. In the first place, the ordinary law of civil and criminal
libel has not been adapted to groups by American courts, which
have generally considered libel as something which can be applied
only to individuals, or at most to small and readily identifiable
groups. Secondly, few states have passed special group libel laws,
possibly for reasons which will be analyzed in this article. And
thirdly, such laws as are on the books have not been the subject of
many cases.
However, now that the United States Supreme Court has given
its blessing to the Illinois group libel statute, 2 the question has
become a very real one. It is likely that this judicial acceptance
will signal the adoption of similar laws by other states, perhaps
even the Federal Government. Consequently, a reassessment of the
validity and utility of such laws seems appropriate.
I
A group libel law is a statute making it a criminal offense to
portray by writing, moving picture or other device, certain groups
in a way which will (a) incite the general population to hate,
ridicule and disparage that group, and/or (b) present a danger of
breach of the peace. The Illinois statute which was upheld by the
Court used both (a) and (b), and referred to groups distinguished
by race, creed or color:
It shall be unlawful for any person, firm or corporation to
manufacture, sell, or offer for sale, advertise or publish, present
or exhibit in any public place in this state any lithograph, moving picture, play, drama or sketch, which publication or exhibition portrays depravity, criminality, uncbastity, or lack of
virtue of a class of citizens, of any race, color, creed or religion
which said publication or exhibition exposes the citizens of any
race, color, creed or religion to contempt, derision, or obloquy
or which is productive of breach of the peace or riots ....
*Interim Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Florida.
1. Democracy and Defamation: Control of Group Libel, 42 Col. L. Rev.
727 (1942) ; see also Tanenhaus, Group Libel, 35 Cornell L. Q. 261 (1950).
2. See Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U. S. 250 (1952).
3. II1. Rev. Stat. c. 38, § 471 (1953). The lawvwas enacted in 1917.
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The purpose of this article is to provide a beginning analysis
of some of the problems posed by such statutes, in the light of
which some judgments may be made as to their wisdom.
The United States Supreme Court, in Beauharnaisv.Illinois,4
upheld the conviction of Joseph Beauharnais under this act, thus
holding the act itself to be constitutional. The Court was closely
divided, with Justices Jackson, Reed, Douglas, and Black each
dissenting on various grounds (as seems to be customary on the
present Court). The case arose out of the publication and circulation by Joseph Beauharnais of a violently intemperate pamphlet,
in petition form, asking the mayor and city council of Chicago to
prevent further incursions of Negroes into white residential areas
in the city. Accompanying the petition was a call for "[o] ne million
self-respecting white people in Chicago to unite . . .If persuasion
and the need to prevent the white race from becoming mongrelized
by the negro will not unite us, then the aggressions ... rapes, robberies, knives, guns and marijuana of the negro, surely will."
Beauharnais was convicted of violating the statute cited above.
Justice Frankfurter wrote the opinion of the Court, stressing
his now familiar doctrine that the states should be allowed a good
deal of latitude for experimen:ation, even in the field of civil liberties, so long as state action is ". . . not unrelated to the problem
and not forbidden by some explicit limitation on the State's
power."' He accepted the Illinois court's opinion that this statute
was merely a variety of criminal libel law, which enabled him to
conclude that since criminal libel laws have always been considered constitutional, this one is also; and it made it possible for
the justice to avoid using the clear and present danger doctrine,
since, he said, this doctrine has no application to libel cases. In
spite of the fact that Illinois law and American custom provide that
a showing of truth and fair comment are defenses against libel
charges, Justice Frankfurter upheld the trial court in its refusal
to hear evidence as to the truth of Beauharnais' statements, claiming
that he could not satisfy the additional requirement of good motive.
The trial judge had told the jury that it could decide only whether
or not Beauharnais had actually been guilty of the writings as
charged; the judge ruled on his own that the writings did violate
the terms of the statute. This was also approved by Justice Frankfurter.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Jackson felt that although the
law was constitutional, the application of it in this case was not,
4. 343 U. S. 250 (1952).
5. Id. at 262.
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since the courts had dispensed with the ordinary safeguards for
the accused-the chance of showing truth, fair comment and privilege. He also felt that the clear and present danger rule was relevant and should have been applied, and that the jury's role was
misconstrued by the trial judge. Justice Reed thought the language
of the statute was too broad and thus included things which should
be protected by the First Amendment; Justice Douglas concurred.
Douglas, in a separate opinion, strongly advanced the opinion that
the majority was unreasonably limiting the right of free speech;
the majority had warned "....

every minority that when the Con-

stitution guarantees free speech it does not mean what it says." 6
justice Douglas also concurred in Black's dissent, in which the
Alabama liberal heatedly warned that no protectipn was here provided for free speech, saying, "State experimentation in curbing
freedom of expression is startling and frightening doctrine in a
country dedicated to self-government by its people. ' 7 He pointed
out that the Illinois statute could easily be used to censor "many
of the world's great classics," as well as many other things commonly accepted as proper. He maintained further that criminal
libel had always been restricted to libels of individuals, referring
mostly to the carrying on of "purely private feuds," and that it
could not properly be extended to cover groups and questions of
public concern. He concluded, "I do not agree that the Constitution leaves freedom of [expression] at the mercy of a case-bycase, day-by-day majority of this Court."
It must be said at the outset that the arguments of neither side
are completely convincing, unless one accepts without reservation
the Black-Douglas thesis, elaborated in several previous cases, that
First Amendment freedoms occupy a preferred position, and that
laws restricting them should therefore be considered unconstitutional unless the state can prove the necessity for the restriction.
Frankfurter's opposing argument is that civil liberties should be
treated on the same basis as other constitutional provisions, giving
the state the benefit of the doubt and allowing wide scope for state
experimentation. Even if this argument itself could be accepted as
valid, it still would not justify some of the points made by Frankfurter in his opinion.
The most obvious criticism is that there can be wide disagreement in individual cases, even if one accepts the Frankfurter doctrine. How wide a scope for experimentation can be allowed by the
6. Id. at 287.
7. Id. at 270.
. Id. at 274.
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courts? Carried to its extreme, it would mean an unusual degree
of self-abnegation by the Court, and could in some circumstances
lead to complete disregard by states of the First Amendment. The
briefs presented to the Court, and Justice Black's dissent, presented
the argument ad horrendurn:that the Illinois law could be used to
suppress all sorts of legitimate criticism; the brief went even further,
warning that any kind of group, even political parties, could claim
protection if such statutes are allowable.sa Frankfurter met these
claims with a quotation borrowed from Justice Holmes' famous
comment about Marshall's statement that "the power to tax is the
power to destroy." Every power, said Frankfurter, may be abused,
but "while this Court sits," abuses will not be permitted. This
comes down, therefore, to an argument over what an "abuse" of
state power is. Such an argument proceeds on such vague grounds
that Justice Black will have none of it. The Beauharnaiscase itself,
he says, illustrates that the court will allow abuses, and in addition, Frankfurter's doctrine puts civil liberties at the mercy of
"case-by-case, day-to-day" court majorities. Black's opposing principle is certainly easier of application, but does it permit adequate
power to the state to advance its legitimate aims, and as applied to
this case, does it allow adequate protection to social minorities?
Accepting the Frankfurter doctrine, one is faced with still
other inadequacies in his opinion. He assumes, almost without discussion, that group libel laws are a proper and valid extension of
ordinary criminal libel. This was the interpretation of the Illinois
courts. It is, however, an arguable point. As Justice Black points
out, group libel is somewhat analogous to the old English law of
seditious libel, which in one of its provisions prohibited writings
calculated to "promote feelings of ill-will and hostility between
different classes of His Majesty's subjects."' Black remarks that
it is just because of such laws that the First Amendment was
enacted. If he is right, Frankfurter certainly says nothing to combat the point.
8a. That Justice Black was not merely imagining things, however, became obvious shortly after the Court's decision, when the Chicago police

censors took advantage of the decision to use the same type of statute to ban
the movie The Miracle. See N. Y. Times, July 22, 1952, p. 21, col. 1. This is
the same picture which the Court refused to allow the New York authorities
to proscribe in Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U. S. 495 (1952). Consequently it is
possible that if a movie cannot be banned on the ground of sacrilege it might
be banned as libel under a grcup libel law. Thus, something more serious
than the rantings of a crackpot may be allowed by this decision. In court,
however, the Chicago authorities preferred to rely on obscenity grounds in

defending their censorship of the movie. Se6 American Civil Liberties Union
v. Chicago, 121 N. E. 2d 585 (Ill. 1954).
9. Quoted in Chafee, Government and Mass Communications 123 (1947).
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Again, moreover, even if one were to concede that criminal
libel can include protection of groups, it is usual to allow defendants
in libel cases to present evidence of the truth of the statements
alleged to be libellous, and to prove that the statements were published "with good motives and for justifiable ends." Beauharnais
was not allowed to present such evidence, even though the Illinois
criminal libel statutes require it, and even though he offered to do
so. Jackson felt that this alone called for a reversal of Beauharnais'
conviction. Frankfurter's only justification for upholding the
Illinois courts in this regard was that the law requires both proof of
truth and of good motives, and Beauharnais' proffered evidence,
even if accepted as proving truth, still would not indicate good
motives. This argument is difficult to understand. If truth was
established it should certainly, on the face of things, tend to indicate good motives as well. Even if that were not so, Beauharnais
was given no chance to indicate that his motives were good either.
In fact, the Illinois Supreme Court thought the words were so
libelous that no good motive could possibly be proven !1 In other
words, neither of the usual defenses to libel was available to him.
There is involved here, however, a deeper and more fundamental
issue, which is one of the real reasons for distinguishing between
individual libel and group libel. Peculiarly enough, none of the
dissenters brought up this point, which is, stated briefly, that in
public discussion of questions of public interest, good motives and
justifiable ends should be assumed in the absence of proof to the
contrary. While in individual libel the burden of proof of good
motives is on the defendant, it would seem that in view of the
importance of discussion in the democratic process, the state should
be required to prove bad motives in group libel cases. This idea
will be discussed later; suffice it to say here, however, that Frankfurter seems to assume bad motives. To sum up this point, Frankfurter on the one hand calls this a libel law, but on the other hand
refuses to allow the defendant the protections normally provided
in libel procedure!
Justice Frankfurter further felt that the trial judge was correct in leaving to the jury only the question of whether Beauharnais wrote and distributed the pamphlet, making a judicial determination that the words did violate the Illinois statute. Black
contested the Frankfurter position, saying, "Such trial by judge
rather than jury was outlawed in England in 1792 by Fox's Libel
10. See People v. Beauharnais, 408 Ill.
512, 518, 97 N. E. 2d 343, 347
(1951).
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Law," 11 and Jackson cites several instances which indicate that the
character of the words is a matter for submission to the jury.' 2
Richard B. Wilson, in an excellent article, 13 has pointed out
still another fault in Justice Frankfurter's analysis of libel. The
Justice assumes, again without discussion, that civil libel and criinnal libel have the same rationale and are directed toward the same
evils. However, as Wilson shows, civil libel stems from the injury
to a person's reputation and, in the American context, the resultant effects on his business. Criminal libel, on the other hand,
has as its basis the fact that some libellous utterances may disturb
the peace and good order of the community, and consequently
may be punished by the state. But it is obvious that group libel is
one means-albeit an unethical one-of conducting the public discussion necessary to the democratic process; consequently, despite
Frankfurter's denial, the First Amendment should apply, since it
was especially designed to p:otect discussion of public issues. On
this basis, it was clearly wrong for Frankfurter to dismiss the
clear and present danger doctrine as irrelevant. If civil and criminal
libel are differentiated as to parpose, they may be treated differently
by the courts.
Turning for a moment to the dissenting opinions, one finds,
similarly, serious defects. Disregarding Reed's comment about the
vagueness of language in the Illinois law-a serious enough charge,
if true-the major points made by the dissenters are that the clear
and present danger rule should be applied, that group libel is an
improper extension of criminal libel, and, fundamentally, that free
speech is too important to be curbed in order to prevent the vilification of social groups.
The clear and present danger doctrine has become, regrettably,
a fetish among liberals on and off the court. As mentioned above,
it is certainly relevant to the Beauharnais case if it is used at all;
but there is a good deal of doubt as to the wisdom of applying it
in group libel or similar cases. The doubt arises from the (almost)
impossible task of proving that words such as Beaubarnais' actually do present a clear and present danger. This difficulty of proof
means that, as long as the doctrine was reasonably interpreted by
the courts, no one could be convicted under group libel laws unless
11. 343 t. S. 250, 274 (1952) (dissenting opinion).
12. Id. at 295-296. For general discussions of the role of the jury in
libel suits, see Newell, Libel and Slander 303 (4th ed. 1924) ; Odgers, Libel
and Slander 94 (6th ed. 1929) ; Note, Constitutionality of Criminal Libel
Laws, 52 Col. L. Rev. 521 (1952).
13. Beauharnais v. Illinois: Bulwark or Breach?, 14 Current Econ.
Comment 59 (1952).
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his words had been, in the words of the Illinois statute, directly
"productive of breach of the peace or riots." A tendency would
not be enough to convict. The use of clear and present danger,
then, as is clearly stated by both Black and Douglas, would have
the effect of preventing the states from acting against group defamation at all.
The dissenters-Black and Douglas-also thought that group
libel laws were not merely an extension of criminal libel; what they
were implying is that such laws are in reality nothing but disguised censorship statutes. As such, say the dissenters, they can
be defended only if the state can prove their necessity beyond doubt.
But this leads us to the same conclusion as the clear and present
danger analysis, for obviously, if a majority of the justices agreed
with Black and Douglas, no group libel law would be considered
necessary, nor, therefore, constitutional. This brings us to the real
underlying disagreement. Black and Douglas argue from the basic
premise, clearly stated in both of their dissenting opinions, that
free speech is too important a part of our system to be abrogated
in order to protect any social group. Frankfurter, on the other
hand, argues that the importance of protecting groups from the
possible disorders resulting from defamation is so fundamental
that it justifies some limitation on free speech. We come, then, to
a conflict of values which may be briefly described as the values
of free discussion and of equality-both essential components of
the American tradition. Further, it is clear that neither the
majority nor the dissenters have a very good answer to the dilemma.
As Wilson remarks, "If 'clear and present danger' continues as
the dominant interpretive canon of the First Amendment, vilification of minority groups must go unchecked." On the other hand,
"If restrictions on group defamation can only be achieved by giving
legislatures carte blanche to punish any utterances which they believe to be dangerous, then the First Amendment is in grave
danger of destruction."' 4 We need not belabor the idea that justice
Frankfurter's conception of judicial restraint is inadequate as applied to civil liberties; past and present history indicate all too
clearly that legislatures are too responsive to articulate pressure
groups-in the states, especially the conservative, pillar-of-thecommunity type-to be trusted to "experiment" with solutions to
social problems, however grave, in ways that involve tampering
with the processes of free discussion. If there is any field in which
14. Id. at 65.
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judicial review of state legislation is justified, civil liberties is the
one.
But the clear and present danger doctrine, as has been often
pointed out,' 5 not only provides no definite guide for judicial conduct, but is also exceedingly naive and archaic in its conception
of the processes of opinion formation. It assumes amounts of
rationality and orderliness in discussion which simply do not exist
in the modem world-if indeed they ever did. Also, it completely
ignores the rise of mass communications media, which give to vilifiers weapons never before possessed with which to carry on large
scale, organized campaigns of defamation. It ignores the present
urbanization of American society, which raises problems of the
maintenance of public order, and also produces a close contact between social groups, which did not exist on such a scale in an
agrarian society. Finally, it ignores the fact that in an industrial
society, systematic vilification of social groups is one of the elements which leads to the various economic discriminations which
are a too prevalent feature of American life.
Having said all this-having indicated that neither Frankfurter's judicial restraint nor Black's laissez-faire attitude is an
adequate answer to the problems with which group libel laws are
intended to cope-can any more adequate answer be formulated?
Must we assume an insoluble dilemma? It is not the purpose of this
article to formulate such an answer, but in a more limited way to
analyze some of the answers that have been suggested, with a view
to the development of some criteria by which the validity of any
proposal can be judged.
Two significant proposals have come to the attention of the
author. These are: (1) the substitution of a new interpretive guide
to the First Amendment to replace the clear and present danger
rule; and (2) the use of group libel laws, with stress on much
greater clarity and better draftsmanship in the laws and with greater
attention to the protection of legitimate criticism.
II
Richard B. Wilson has suggested16 that we forget about the
clear and present danger doctrine, at least so far as group libel
cases are concerned. He proposes, first, that our standard for judgment be, not clear and present danger, but the maintenance and
15. See, e.g., Latham, The Theory of the JudicialConcept of Freedom
of Speech, 52 J. of Pol. 637 (1950).
16. Beauharnais v. Illinois: Bulwark or Breach?, 14 Current Econ.
Comment 59 (1952).
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improvement of our capacity for self-government. No speech restriction should be allowed unless it contributes to the process of
self-government. The purpose of legislation must meet this test.
Second, Wilson believes that the actual restriction of speech must
"bear a reasonable relationship" to that purpose. A reasonable relationship exists "when the class singled out for special treatment
incorporates all or most of that trait or characteristic which the
community has found it necessary to suppress"; but further, "there
must be compelling reasons why the community's objective cannot
,,17
be achieved without the imposition of certain restrictions. ....
In commenting on his proposals, Wilson says that group defamation springs from anti-democratic character traits and may "pervert the communication process" so as to reduce our capacity for
self-government. ". . . [B]oth the minority group libeler and his
more receptive auditors are basically antagonistic to the democratic
process," and if such practices become prevalent among hostile
groups, it "would render democratic functioning impossible."- 8
Therefore, he concludes, there is a reasonable relationship between
restrictions on group vilification and the maintenance of self-government. He proposes a degree test: the degree of ethnocentrism
present in the speaker's statements plus the degree of the public's
hostility to the defamed group. "If the degree in each case is found
to be sufficient to indicate the presence of psychotic or neurotic
hostility patterns representing a severe distortion of reality,"' 9
then the reasonable relationship has been proven, and thus the
legislation must be approved by the courts.
Fundamentally, this is an emxtension of the Frankfurter doctrine. Frankfurter also uses a reasonable relationship test; but the
trouble, as pointed out above, is that the answer is purely subjective; it comes only out of the judges' own personal assessments
first, of whether there is a reasonable relationship, and second, of
whether the objective of the legislation is important enough. It is
true that Frankfurter strives for objectivity by giving the legislature the benefit of the doubt. This has two defects: it is almost a
blank check for the legislature, and, as cases such as Lochner v.
Arcw York20 indicate, the line between reasonable and unreasonable
lies in a different place according to who is drawing it. Rules of
17. Id. at 67.
18. Id. at 68-69.
19. Id. at 69.
20. 198 U. S. 45 (1905) (a New York statute limiting hours of work in
bakeries held invalid as an unreasonable interference with the individual's
liberty to contract).
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reason, in other words, are no more precise than clear and present
danger rules.
Wilson attempts to correct these defects of the Frankfurter
doctrine by adding some more precise test than the presuppositions
of the legal mind. First, only one objective is relevant for laws
limiting free speech: the maintenance and improvement of our
capacity for self-government. That this is a praiseworthy objective
no one would deny; but it is not clear that it is the only legitimate
one, nor is it always easy to define. It does, perhaps, lend some certainty to Frankfurter's grant of power to state legislatures, for all
Frankfurter says is that the legislation must be relevant to the
problem; apparently it makes no difference what the problem is.
Second, where Frankfurter asks for a "reasonable relationship" but
provides no method for ascertaining whether one exists, Wilson
proposes an actual test-bow much hostility is present in the
speaker and his audience? Does it reach psychotic or neurotic
levels? If so, the curbing of speech is reasonable; if not, it is not
reasonable.
There are two major weak points in Wilson's proposal. First,
it seriously underestimates the difficulty of deciding what does,
and what does not, advance the capacity for self-government. This
reminds one of the standard politician's cliche: "I stand for the
public good." Fine. But what is the public good? Analogously, the
precise argument between Frankfurter and Black could become,
using Wilson's proposal, a disagreement over what does lead to a
greater capacity for self-government. Frankfurter would probably
say (as Wilson does) that group libel is a significant indication of
social illness of an anti-democratic nature, and can be suppressed.
Black might rejoin that limitations on speech in them-selves limit
the capacity for self-govermnent. There is little indication that the
use of Wilson's test would change the mind of either side as to the
result in the Beauharnais case. Many believe that the Supreme
Court is already loaded down with tests that do not test, measurements that do not measure, and definitions that do not define.
Nevertheless, even a defective test is probably better than none
-and teachers, who use defective tests constantly on their students
in the absence of anything better, cannot afford to be too selfrighteous about the limitations developed for the guidance of our
courts in very difficult situations. Anything that ties down the
Frankfurter doctrine to some central focus will doubtless be an
improvement.
The second criticism of Wilson's proposals refers to his sug-
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gestion that we must measure the amount of hostility, in psychological terms, to determine whether the legislature's solution contributes to the maintenance of the capacity for self-government.
Again, Wilson has added to Frankfurter by trying to pin him down.
But as Wilson himself admits, there is much doubt whether psychology knows enough to test group-or even individual-psychoses and neuroses with much assurance or precision. Further, neither
judges nor legislators are psychologists, nor are they in the habit of
turning to psychologists for expert advice. Further, who is to
determine what degree of hostility is enough to make a law reasonable? Would a new clear and present danger rule be needed?
In brief, one may say that Wilson's proposals are interesting
and represent a praiseworthy effort to distill some certainty out of
the uncertainties of constitutional interpretation. Constitutional
law is refractory material, however, and such attempts usually produce only new uncertainties. This is not to disparage efforts such as
that of Wilson, but to face the reality that social problems cannot
be solved merely by definitions and interpretations.
III
Another proposal which is of some interest focuses on an attempt to minimize the threat to free speech posed by group libel
laws through the use of care in drafting. The common assumption
of such proposals is that if discrimination and care are used, a
line can be drawn between legitimate and illegitimate criticism.
One such attempt is a model group libel law published in the
Columbia Law Review.2 1
This model statute emphasizes careful definition of the words
used; it includes both written and oral statements; it is set up as
both a civil and a criminal statute which can be enforced either
through private suit or government prosecution; it guards against
multiple suits; and it aims at group defamation both as a threat to
peace and good order in the community and to the group defamed.
One cannot object, of course, to any attempt to introduce clarity
and precision into the law; but there are certain characteristics of
group libel laws that cannot, seemingly, be avoided if the law is to
be at all effective. The Columbia model shows up these characteristics clearly.
What is the position of the jury in group libel cases? If the
determination of libel or no libel is left to the jury (it was not in
the Beauharnaiscase) it is often unlikely that a defendant can be
21. See Note, Statutory Prohibition of Group Defamation, 47 Col.
L. Rev. 595, 609-612 (1947).
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convicted no matter what he has said, for the jury will agree with
him. If the libelled group is so strong in the community as to make
up the jury, the point of the law as a protection of weak minorities
is lost; but if the jury represemts the dominant groups, convictions
will be hard to secure. And further, prosecutors will be reluctant
even to introduce such cases in court. The Illinois group libel
statute has been on the books since 1917; so far as can be discovered, only two previous cases have been prosecuted in the
thirty-five year history of the law. There is nothing in the Columbia model which would mitigate these considerations.
The language of group libel laws is, in some respects, necessarily vague, which means that in some cases legitimate comment
may be punished, while in others libellous language may go unpunished. The Columbia model law strives to avoid this by providing, first, that a statement mu st be false as well as defamatory, and
second, more adjectives than have normally been present in such
laws. For instance, a defamatory statement is one which ".. . holds
up the group ...to public contempt, hatred, shame, disgrace or
obloquy, or causes [it] . . .lo be shunned, avoided, or injured in

...business, profession or occupation." 22 The law makes criminal
". .. any offensive, abusive, insulting or derogatory words except when used in the course of and as a part of an exposition primarily directed to the advocacy of ideas on matters of public concern ..."23
Two things should be remarked about such provisions. First,
it is doubtful whether five vague words are any dearer than one.
Vagueness comes, of course, not from the word itself, but from
the context and circumstanoes in which the challenged statement
was uttered. An offensive word in one context or place might be
inoffensive or even considered admirable somewhere else. Beauharnais' words would not be thought libellous in South Carolina.
Second, the line between legitimate and illegitimate use of language is, except in extreme cases, impossible to draw. Beauharnais
could claim with perfect sincerity that his statements were used
"in the course of and as a part of an exposition primarily directed to
the advocacy of ideas on matters of public concern." Certainly no
one would say that residential segregation (or the ending of it) is
not a matter of public concern. Consequently, it would be difficult
to convict under this part of the Columbia statute; one would have
to fall back on breach of the peace or the falsity of the statement.
But as the dissenters in Beauharnaiscogently point out, there was
22. Id. at 609.

23. Id. at 612.
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no threat to the peace in Beauharnais' petition, except in a -very
indirect sense which it is doubtful that courts can measure or of
which they should take cognizance. This is likely to be true in
most cases. As for the truth or falsity of the statement, one would
have a difficult time proving either, particularly in very complex
social situations such as the one to which the Beauharnais case
refers. In such affairs, truth is not easily ascertainable; even the
relevance and interpretation of statistics is subject to a great deal
of dispute. How could one "prove" Beauharnais' statements to be
either true or false?
Libel statutes, and the Columbia model is no exception, reverse
the usual order of things by providing that the burden of proof of
truth is on the defendant. But in the light of this argument it can
be seen that the defendant could not prove the truth of most statements; thus almost all defendants would be convicted. Yet if the
burden were put on the plaintiff, no one would be convicted !
Space limitations prevent reference here to some other inherent
defects in group libel laws. They are referred to elsewhere. 24 Enough
has been said herein to indicate that much of the faith in such
statutes results from an over-simplification of the process of dividing legitimate from illegitimate comment, and truth from untruth.
Possibly some improvement would result from the careful
franiing of group libel laws combined with Wilson's attempts at
precision in application. If we are to have such laws, surely all the
care and precision possible are to be desired.
IV
Two other suggestions in the general field of group libel may
be dealt with briefly. One is that publications printing "hate"
propaganda be forced to print replies. The value of this is problematical at best, and it could, of course, reach only that propaganda
which appears in the institutionalized press: periodicals, radio, and
television. It could have no effect as to movies, nor could it reach
to pamphleteers like Beauharnais.
Finally, it has been proposed that all propagandists be forced
to disclose their identity. The utility of identification is also doubtful, even assuming the absence of "front" organizations. Beauharnais' White Circle League identification openly appeared in his
pamphlets. Identification statutes in such cases serve no purpose at
all, though they might have a limited value in some other circumstances.
24. See Chafee, op. cit. mtpra note 9, at 122-129.
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V

In the light of these proposals, and keeping in mind the general
principles stressed earlier-th..t equality and free speech are both
integral parts of the democratic heritage--can we adduce any
criteria upon which to base conclusions? The following is an attempt to state some such criteria.
1. The Primacy of Speech. Even though we concede that both
free speech and equality are integral values, yet we need not conclude that we can never choose between them; in fact, cases like
Beauharnaisindicate that we must do so. But on what basis?
First, we may say that free speech and equality are different
in nature and thus also in application. Free speech can be achieved
by laissez-faire government; equality, only through governmental
action. In other words, it is only through the absence of restrictions
that free speech can exist, whereas equality must be fostered positively. There is a multiplicity of ways to strive for equality: by
group libel laws, by FEPC legislation, by long-range social education, by psychological treatment of the prejudiced, etc. This multiplicity of available methods means that there is no absolute dependence on group libel laws to achieve the goal of equality. Consequently, one might conclude that free speech comes first in such
a case.
There is, also, a sense in which Justices Black and Douglas may
be right in their insistence on the preferred position of free speech.
Democracy, and with it democratic processes and institutions, is
dependent on free speech for its existence. The right to persuade,
to form new majorities, is basic to free institutions. Without free
speech, democratic processes do not function--do not, indeed, exist
at all. An election in the absence of free speech is not a real election even though all the formalities may be present.
On the other hand, it seems to be true that democratic processes
can function, even for relatively long periods of time, without
equality. This is illustrated by the fact that nations using democratic processes have existed over many years-Athens, Great
Britain, Switzerland, the United States-without achieving equality. In some cases they have never even approximated it. From
this, it appears that free speech-practically if not philosophically
-is more basic to self-government than is equality.
Yet a third consideration tending to the same point may be
introduced. With free speech, minority religious groups can enlarge themselves-may theoretically even reach majority status;
with free speech, minority racial groups may reach equality of
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status. Without the privilege of free speech, the building of
minorities into majorities is difficult or impossible; and such equal
status as a group may have is very precarious. In any society,
minorities run risks of being discriminated against; if they have
free speech they can at least protest against such discrimination.
These arguments, in the writer's view, indicate the primacy of
free speech in the value hierarchy. If this is so, one should be exceedingly cautious about infringing that right. One criterion for
dealing with the problem of group vilification, therefore, is to
avoid, if possible, any limitations on free discussion.
2. Proof of Good Motive. As remarked earlier, and in consequence of the importance of free speech just discussed, it seems
unjust to require the defendant in group libel cases to prove good
motives and justifiable ends. It may reluctantly be conceded that,
as to the truth of statements, the ordinary legal rule of proof should
be reversed; but as to motive this does not hold. In speaking of
groups, which are of public concern, truth is its own motive. If the
statements charged as libellous are proved to be true, good motives
should be assumed. In this respect the Columbia proposal discussed above 25 is a distinct advance over the legal construction used
by the Illinois courts in the Beauharnais case, for it does not require proof of good motives.
In any case, one should never, as did the Illinois Supreme
Court, assume bad motives or unjustifiable ends merely from the
nature of the words used. Even false words can be used with good
motives. But beyond that, the attribution of bad motives is extremely inappropriate for courts in dealing with public questions. Why
need one challenge the motives and sincerity of Joseph Beauharnais,
who is espousing a doctrine both believed in and practiced in many
parts of this country, and concerning a problem about which all
thoughtful Americans are worried? Segregation is a problem of
public concern, on which differing viewpoints may be held with
sincerity and good motives. Strong or abusive language does not
prove bad intent.
A second criterion, then, might be that any limitations on
speech must be on the basis of falsity or bad effect, not unjustifiable intent.
3. Ineffectiveness of Group Libel Law. The writer is not one
of those who object to social legislation on the ground that social
customs cannot be changed by law. But due to considerations already mentioned, plus others here discussed, he believes that group
25. See note 21 supra and text thereto.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:167

libel laws are unlikely to achieve any substantial result. Difficulties
of enforcement and interpretation
have already been alluded to,
26
but several other defects arise.
One is the inadequacy of proof that any particular statement
actually damages the group. Such damage as may occur is certainly not measurable; in some contexts none may result. The
cumulative effects of the statements of many people over a long
period of time cannot be ignored; but again, they are not measurable. Even if they were, the individual contribution to the cumulative total would probably be so slight as not to justify suppression.
Nor would such suppression take adequate account of the countereffects of other propaganda, education, social evolution, etc.
It has been well pointed out 27 that group libel laws hit at one
of the manifestations of prejudice, not at prejudice itself or at its
causes. This can, of course, be said also of other types of nondiscrimination legislation. But other types do not infringe on the
basic right of free speech. It is certainly true, however, that organized vilification can add to prejudice, even though it does not
create it, and this is a major justification for group defamation
legislation.
Group libel laws may have the effect of damaging the minority
group rather than protecting it. The fact that certain groups are
singled out for such protection may easily lead to increased hostility against them, especially if frequent and well-publicized trials
are necessary to enforce the law. A few cases of unwise convictions, a few martyrs, a few exaggerated headlines could more than
cancel out the good intentions of the law.
In spite of such contentions, it cannot be taken as proven that
group libel legislation is not worthwhile. Our third criterion, then,
must be more moderate. If the law is not likely to achieve the ahn,
the suppression of speech is not justified, and some other nethod
should be sought.
4. Positive Measures. In the long run it seems likely that discrimination and prejudice will not be cured by negative protective
measures such as those herein discussed. Some positive steps need
to be taken. In other words, results will not come from limiting
the rights of the majority, but from granting effective rights to
minorities. We are already well on the road to such a positive approach in some fields. Negroes not only have the right to vote, but
are more and more being enabled to exercise that right; FEPC
26. Some of these problems are cogently discussed in Note, Group Libel,
41 Calif. L. Rev. 290 (1953).
27. See Chafee, op. cit. supra note 9, at 127.
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laws are positive methods of attempting to remove job discrimination; the end of segregation in the Armed Services, with the attendant publicity, is another example.
In the field of public discussion it is necessary, not to limit discussion about minority groups, but to facilitate discussion by
minority groups. One of the main problems has been that our
mass communications agencies have not been sufficiently open to
minority groups and viewpoints. Instead, they too often express,
by innuendo and indirection, the same attitudes which the courts
branded as libellous in the Beauharnaiscase. The fourth criterion,
following from this, is: positive encouragements to non-discrimination should be preferred to negative deterrents to discrimination.
5. Role of Groups in Society. An unspoken premise of group
libel laws is that groups are personalities and thus should be protected against libel just as are individuals. American political
thought, however, has always rejected the organic theory of groups.
It is true that corporate groups are legally considered as persons,
but that this is a legal fiction is universally recognized. Group libel
laws pertain largely, however, to non-corporate groups, for corporate entities can be protected by individual libel procedures.
Some have argued that the modem importance of groups is so
great that they have assimilated the individual and taken over his
role in political life. This may be true to some extent, but it ignores
the important fact that most people belong to several groups; consequently, most groups have split personalities. Many so-called
groups are split among themselves-Negroes and Jews are examples. To treat a group as if it were a separate entity,, entirely
apart from the differing views of the people in it, seems as unrealistic as to act as if groups did not exist.
An additional, and overruling, consideration must be added.
The more important groups become in our social and political
processes, the more they become items for serious public concern,
and the more important it is that they be subject to continuous public scrutiny and discussion. The dominating role of groups in
American life does not justify suppressing discussion about them:
it makes that discussion more essential than ever. No group is
perfect, not even a minority group. As a prominent Jewish spokesman, arguing against group libel laws, has said, "The aims and
activities of racial and religious groups are matters of genuine
public interest. To say that no racial or religious group ever merited
unfavorable criticism is to read history through rose-tinted glasses.
..To prohibit the denunciation of racial and religious groups is to
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provide immunity from criticism for even the most perverse
group.)228 The final criterion is that groups must be treated on a
different basis than individuals. The analogy of individual and

2
group libel does not hold.
These criteria do not prescribe a course of action for the protection of minority groups in our society. They merely point to
some of the relevant concepts which the author believes are necessary to such a course of action. Obviously the problem lends itself
to no ready solution;30 but men of good will, working within the
framework of the democratic process, should be able to preserve
that process while yet mitigating the evils of mass vilification.

28. S. A. Fineberg, Can Anti-Semitism be Outlawed, 6 Contemp. Jewish
Record 619 (1943).
29. See Note, supra note 26.
30. Though the literature on the subject of group libel is surprisingly
scarce, the following books and articles, together with those cited above, are
noteworthy: Fraenkel, Our Civil Liberties (1949) ; Lusky, Minority Rights
and the Public Interest, 52 Yale L. J. 1 (1942) ; Note, Freedom of Speech
and Group Libel Statutes, 1 Bill of Rights Rev. 221 (1941).

